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Abstract 
We live in a world in which scientific expertise, and its epistemic authority and autonomy, 
become more and more important. On the other hand, the financial interests in research, which 
could potentially corrupt science, are increasing. Due to these two tendencies, a concern for the 
integrity of scientific research becomes increasingly vital. This concern is, however, hollow if we 
do not have a clear account of research integrity. Therefore, it is important that we explicate this 
concept. Following Rudolf Carnap‟s characterization of the task of explication, this means that 
we should develop a concept that is (1) similar to our common sense notion of research integrity, 
(2) exact, (3) fruitful, and (4) as simple as possible. Since existing concepts do not meet these 
four requirements, we develop a new concept in this article. We describe a concept of epistemic 
integrity that is based on the property of deceptiveness, and argue that this concept does meet 
Carnap‟s four requirements of explication. To illustrate and support our claims we use several 
examples from scientific practice, mainly from biomedical research. 
Keywords: epistemic integrity; research integrity; scientific integrity; deception; biomedical 
research; explication 
 
1. Introduction 
A lot of philosophers of science, politicians and scientists, as well as the general public, 
consider it crucial that the integrity of scientific research is protected. Such concerns have only 
increased with recent large-scale shifts in science such as the commercialization and privatization 
of research. A writing that is especially relevant in this context, is Martinson, Anderson & de 
Vries‟ 2005 commentary in Nature, in which a wide range of research practices that threaten the 
integrity of science, besides falsification, fabrication and plagiarism, is identified. Martinson, 
Anderson & de Vries (2005) show that the breadth and prevalence of some of these questionable 
research practices is striking. This finding has intensified pre-existing worries about the integrity 
of scientific research.
1
 Given such concerns and worries, it is, however, very remarkable that it is 
so hard to pin down what we exactly mean by integrity (Resnik 2011, p. 399). What is exactly at 
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 The fact that Web of Science® currently includes 216 articles citing Martinson, Anderson & de Vries (2005) 
indicates that it is a quite influential writing. 
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stake here? What is exactly threatened when we say that something threatens the integrity of 
scientific research? What does it mean for scientific research to have integrity? 
In this article, we explicate the concept of research integrity. Carnap characterizes the task of 
explication as follows: 
 
If a concept is given as explicandum, the task consists in finding another concept as its 
explicatum which fulfils the following requirements to a sufficient degree. 
1. The explicatum is to be similar to the explicandum in such a way that, in most cases in 
which the explicandum has so far been used, the explicatum can be used; however, close 
similarity is not required, and considerable differences are permitted. 
2. The characterization of the explicatum, that is, the rules of its use (for instance, in the form 
of a definition), is to be given in an exact form, so as to introduce the explicatum into a well-
connected system of scientific concepts. 
3. The explicatum is to be a fruitful concept, that is, useful for the formulation of many 
universal statements (empirical laws in the case of a nonlogical concept, logical theorems in 
the case of a logical concept). 
4. The explicatum should be as simple as possible; this means as simple as the more important 
requirements (1), (2), and (3) permit. (Carnap 1950, p. 7) 
 
Carnap states that philosophers, scientists and mathematicians make explications very frequently. 
Following Weber, De Vreese & Van Bouwel (forthcoming), we wish to note, however, that the 
fruitfulness of philosophical explications (see third requirement) may not lie in their usefulness 
for formulating empirical generalizations (like scientific explications) and/or 
mathematical/logical theorems (like mathematical/logical explications), but rather in their 
usefulness for formulating clear guidelines for scientists. What we aim at in this article is then to 
introduce a concept, which we call “epistemic integrity,”2 that is (1) similar to our common sense 
notion of research integrity, (2) exact, that is, clear and well-defined, (3) fruitful, that is, useful 
for the development and justification of norms for individuals and institutions involved in 
science, and (4) as simple as requirements (1), (2) and (3) permit. 
Admittedly, several definitions of concepts like “research integrity,” “integrity of the research 
process” and “scientific integrity” have already been offered, but these do not meet the 
requirements of explication to a sufficient degree. Take, for instance, Nicholas Steneck‟s (2006) 
definition. He defines research integrity as “possessing and steadfastly adhering to professional 
standards, as outlined by professional organizations, research institutions and, when relevant, the 
government and public” (Steneck 2006, p. 56). This is not very helpful to, say, a professional 
organization that wants to develop professional standards to which research should adhere in 
order to have (the highest degree of) integrity. Any standards this organization develops will 
guarantee research integrity according to the definition, and so the definition does not offer any 
guidance in outlining professional standards, which renders it useless for the organization under 
consideration. This means that Steneck‟s notion of research integrity does not meet the third 
requirement of explication – it is not fruitful – and therefore his account cannot be regarded as a 
good explication. Other accounts of research integrity (e.g., Haack 2007; Kochan 2011; National 
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 The reason why we call our explicatum “epistemic integrity” is that there seem to be two distinct notions of 
research integrity in use – an epistemic notion, which focuses on the reliability of the results of research, and a moral 
notion, which concerns the moral acceptability of research practices. In this article, we only focus on the epistemic 
notion, as this is, we believe the more common, and also the more interesting notion of research integrity. 
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Academy of Sciences 1992; Parizeau 1999; Petrovečki & Scheetz 2001; Office of Research 
Integrity 2007) have the problem that they are not sufficiently exact. They typically refer to 
principles such as honesty and verifiability, but do not (sufficiently) explain these principles, so 
that the notion of integrity remains vague. 
In the next sections, we develop a concept of epistemic integrity that succeeds, as we will 
argue, in explicating the notion of research integrity. As our concept of epistemic integrity is 
based on the property of deceptiveness, we start by defining this property in the next section, and 
we clarify this definition on the basis of some examples from scientific practice. In section 3, we 
define the concept of epistemic integrity, and in section 4, we show that this concept fulfills the 
four requirements of explication. We conclude in section 5. 
2. Deceptiveness 
Before we introduce our concept of epistemic integrity, we should clarify what we mean by 
deceptiveness, as we will refer to this property in our explication. We focus on deceptiveness of 
statements. When is a statement deceptive? Firstly, we should remark that whether or not a 
statement is deceptive depends on whom it is communicated to and his/her background 
assumptions. Consider a clinical trial in which part of the study population is given the most 
adequate doses of a new test drug, and the other part is given inadequate doses of a competing 
product.
3
 The percentage of patients that recover from a certain health condition is significantly 
higher in the test group. Suppose the study leader would then report that he conducted a clinical 
trial in which part of the study population received the test drug, and the other part received the 
competing product, and that a significantly higher percentage of patients recovered from their 
condition in the test group, without mentioning that the competing product was administered in 
inadequate doses. This report is deceptive – it causes people to overestimate the relative 
effectiveness of the test drug – but only because it is generally assumed that in active-controlled 
trials, all products are administered in adequate doses. People who do not make this assumption 
may not be misled. Those who assume that the competing product is administered in inadequate 
doses will not overestimate the relative effectiveness of the test drug as a result of the study 
leader‟s report, and so this report is not deceptive to them. 
So the first question we have to answer is: When is a statement s, stated by person P1, 
deceptive to a person P2? We consider s deceptive to P2 if and only if (i) s is presented to P2 as a 
true statement, and (ii) either (a) s is false, or (b) P2 infers a false statement s’ from s and it is 
legitimate for P2 to make this inference (given what is usually the case when a statement like s is 
true, what persons like P1 usually mean by statements like s, what P1 says about the interpretation 
of s, etc.). s is more deceptive as P2‟s inference from s to s’ is more legitimate. The general 
degree of deceptiveness of a statement s is higher as s is more deceptive to a higher percentage of 
the people to whom it is communicated. 
This account can be clarified on the basis of some examples. We start with a standard example 
of deception in science: a scientist, let us call him Dr. Smith, fabricates certain data, presents 
these data as the results of empirical investigations, and makes a certain claim, say that drug D 
does not increase the risk of heart failure (s1), on the basis of his so-called empirical data. Why is 
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 This example is not unrealistic. The commercialization of biomedical science has stimulated epistemically 
problematic research practices such as the one in the example (Reiss 2010, p. 432). A new test drug for a certain 
condition is sometimes compared to inadequate doses of some other product (Rochon et al. 1994; Tandon & 
Fleischhacker 2005), or to a product that is administered in an inadequate way (Johansen & Gøtzsche 1999). 
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s1 deceptive? In case drug D does increase the risk of heart failure, s1 is deceptive because it is 
false, while Dr. Smith presents it as true (conditions (i) and (ii)(a) are met). But even if drug D 
does not increase the risk of heart failure, and s1 is true, it is nevertheless highly deceptive. The 
reason is that people will infer from it that empirical research, namely Dr. Smith‟s empirical 
research, shows that drug D does not increase the risk of heart failure (s1’). This inference is 
legitimate because Dr. Smith presents his claim as a conclusion based on data that he obtained 
empirically. Because the data were in fact fabricated, s1’ is false, and hence, s1 is deceptive 
(conditions (i) and (ii)(b) are met). 
Now consider a second case. Suppose a scientist states that research does not reveal whether 
or not climate change is occurring (s2), while there actually is an abundance of scientific evidence 
suggesting that it is. Although the scientist‟s statement may be true as he interprets it – e.g., 
research does not provide a 100% certainty about climate change – it can nevertheless be highly 
deceptive. This is because a lot of people will infer from s2 that the scientific arguments for 
climate change do not substantially outweigh the scientific arguments against climate change 
(s2’), which is false, and this inference is legitimate because s2’ is in fact a more obvious 
interpretation of s2 than the scientist‟s interpretation. s2 would be less deceptive if the scientist 
explained what he meant and what he didn‟t mean by s2. The more this is highlighted (think of, 
e.g., mentioning it directly after stating s2 versus referring to an article in which the correct 
interpretation is in a footnote), the less legitimate it is for the audience to keep inferring s2’ from 
s2, and thus, the less deceptive s2. 
In the aforementioned example of the test drug being compared to inadequate doses of a 
competing product, the problem is similar. A lot of people will interpret the study leader‟s claim 
that the percentage of patients recovering from their health condition was significantly higher in 
the test group (s3) as follows: in the clinical trial he conducted, the percentage of patients 
recovering from their health condition was significantly higher in the group receiving adequate 
doses of the test drug than in the group receiving adequate doses of the competing product (s3’). 
Although the latter statement is false (because there was no group receiving adequate doses of the 
competing product), it is legitimate for the audience to infer s3’ from s3, because (1) it is generally 
assumed that in active-controlled trials, all products are administered in adequate doses, since 
using inadequate doses usually does not make sense, and (2) the study leader did not mention that 
the competing product was administered in inadequate doses. Because conditions (i) and (ii)(b) of 
our account of deceptiveness are met, s3 is deceptive (to the people inferring s3’ from s3). To 
people who assume that the competing product was administered in inadequate doses, s3 is not 
deceptive, since they will not infer the false statement s3’ from it. Note that this analysis of the 
deceptiveness of s3 does not refer to any intentions. Our account implies that s3 is deceptive to the 
people inferring s3’ from s3, regardless of whether the study leader has the intent to deceive or 
not. 
3. Epistemic integrity 
Now, let us introduce our notion of epistemic integrity. While deceptiveness is, as we 
characterized it, a property of statements, epistemic integrity is a property of practices resulting in 
certain statements. More specifically, we define the epistemic integrity of a practice as a function 
of the degree to which the statements resulting from this practice are deceptive. The more 
deceptive these statements, the lower the epistemic integrity of the practice. Applied to scientific 
research, we get: the more deceptive the (so-called) results or conclusions of scientific research, 
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the lower the epistemic integrity of this research. To illustrate this, we can again refer to the 
example of comparing adequate doses of a new test drug to inadequate doses of a competing 
product. If the report of such a study is highly deceptive (because it conceals the fact that the 
competing product was administered in inadequate doses), then the epistemic integrity of the 
research is low. So the epistemic integrity of research is determined on the basis of its results 
(more specifically, on the basis of how deceptive these results are). 
Besides research itself, other kinds of practices in science could have a degree of epistemic 
integrity as well. Take, for instance, the fabrication of data which are presented as the results of 
empirical investigations. Since the data are fabricated, no actual research is involved. But because 
the practice under consideration results in a deceptive report, it could be said to have low 
epistemic integrity. 
Finally, we should mention an important constraint on what we mean by „statements resulting 
from a practice.‟ Here, we assume that for a statement to be considered a result of a certain 
practice, it should be produced within this practice, by persons or entities who are actually 
involved in the practice. The epistemic integrity of the practice only depends on the 
deceptiveness of such statements. So, for instance, if a scientist who is not involved in a certain 
research project draws false conclusions from it, and presents them as true, this does not entail 
that the research upon which he relies has low epistemic integrity. His analysis of the research 
and its results may have low epistemic integrity, but the epistemic integrity of the research 
project itself is not compromised as long as those involved in the project have not made any 
deceptive claims themselves. 
4. The four requirements of explication 
Is our concept of epistemic integrity a good explicatum for the concept of research integrity? 
In this section we examine whether it fulfils the four requirements of explication we mentioned in 
the introduction: similarity to the explicandum, exactness, fruitfulness and simplicity. 
4.1. Similarity to the explicandum 
The first question is whether epistemic integrity is, as we define it, sufficiently similar to our 
common sense notion of research integrity. As already mentioned, close similarity is not 
required, and considerable differences are permitted. What is required for good explication is that 
in most cases in which the explicandum has so far been used, the explicatum can be used (Carnap 
1950, p. 7). Does our concept of epistemic integrity satisfy this requirement? 
To support the claim that it does, let us take a look at a particular case in which the concept 
“integrity” is applied to a context of scientific research. As we have called our explicatum 
“epistemic integrity,” we look into a case in which this specific term is used as well: Justin 
Biddle‟s 2007 essay on the Vioxx affair. The Vioxx affair concerns the questionable research on 
Vioxx, a painkiller owned by pharmaceutical giant Merck & Co., Inc. In the abstract of the paper, 
Biddle states that “the research was organized in such a way as to allow short-term commercial 
interests to compromise epistemic integrity” (Biddle 2007, p. 21). Is this use of the term 
“epistemic integrity” compatible with our concept of epistemic integrity? Let us argue that it is. 
Biddle mentions two reasons for believing that Merck‟s research on Vioxx was epistemically 
irresponsible: 
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The first is that, between 2000 (or even earlier) and 2004, Merck consistently mischaracterized 
the current state of knowledge regarding the possible cardiovascular side effects of Vioxx. The 
hypothesis that Vioxx did not possess dangerous cardiovascular side effects was, until 2004, 
uncertain, and Merck knew that it was uncertain. Despite this, the company consistently and 
publicly asserted that Vioxx was safe. Secondly, there are serious questions about whether 
Merck honestly reported data that was unfavorable to its financial interests. Since the 
withdrawal of the drug, information has come to light suggesting that Merck scientists did not 
report all of the cardiovascular events that they should have, thus calling into question at least 
two of the studies that reflected favorably upon Vioxx. (Biddle 2007, p. 27) 
 
Our account of deceptiveness implies that the two questionable research practices that this 
passage refers to both involve the production of deceptive claims. Firstly, consider the 
mischaracterization of the current state of knowledge regarding the possible cardiovascular side 
effects of Vioxx. An obvious implication of statements like “Merck & Co., Inc. today 
reconfirmed the favorable cardiovascular safety profile of Vioxx® (rofecoxib)” (press release by 
Merck, entitled “Merck confirms favorable cardiovascular safety profile of Vioxx®,” dated May 
22, 2001), is “today, Merck has sufficient scientific evidence to accept that Vioxx is safe.” 
Therefore, it is legitimate to infer the latter from the former statement, and we can expect a lot of 
people to have made this inference. Because it is not true that Merck had, at the time, sufficient 
scientific evidence to accept that Vioxx was safe, the statement “Merck & Co., Inc. today 
reconfirmed the favorable cardiovascular safety profile of Vioxx® (rofecoxib)” was highly 
deceptive (see our notion of deceptiveness presented in section 2 of this article). The second 
questionable research practice, inadequate reporting of unfavorable data, also involved the 
production of highly deceptive claims. When Merck scientists reported that in the VIGOR trial, 
17 heart attacks occurred in the Vioxx group, while in fact there were 20, and that in the 
Advantage trial, five patients in the Vioxx group suffered heart attack or sudden cardiac death, 
while there were actually six or more, they presented false statements as true statements. 
Therefore, these statements were highly deceptive (again, see our notion of deceptiveness in 
section 2). 
Because Merck‟s research on Vioxx resulted in highly deceptive statements, it had low 
epistemic integrity (see our notion of epistemic integrity presented in section 3 of this article). 
This could be explained by Merck‟s short-term commercial interests. The deceptive statements 
served these interests better than the truth – making the evidence for Vioxx‟s safety appear more 
compelling than it actually was, promoted the sale of Vioxx in the short term – and this may be 
the reason why these statements were produced. If we endorse this explanation, as we think 
Biddle would, then we can conclude that in the Vioxx affair, short-term commercial interests 
were allowed to compromise epistemic integrity, which is exactly what Biddle claims in his 
abstract. Thus, our concept of epistemic integrity is compatible with Biddle‟s use of the term. 
Our concept of epistemic integrity is also compatible with Nicholas Steneck‟s (2006) 
discussion of irresponsible behavior in research. He mentions fabrication, falsification, 
plagiarism, misrepresentation, inaccuracy, and bias as behaviors that damage research integrity. 
In 4.3 of this article we show, for each of these behaviors, that our concept of epistemic integrity 
implies that it undermines the epistemic integrity of research. Another example is Susan Haack‟s 
(2007) account of the integrity of science. She defines it as the adherence to the values of honesty 
and sharing. In 4.3 of this article we show why honesty and sharing are important to protect the 
epistemic integrity of scientific research. There is also an overlap between the examples Haack 
gives of threats to scientific integrity and the examples we give in this article (e.g., she also refers 
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to the Vioxx case). So her use of the terms “integrity of science” and “scientific integrity” is 
compatible with our concept of epistemic integrity. 
We can of course not conclude on the basis of three examples (Biddle, Steneck, and Haack) 
that our explicatum can be used in most cases in which the explicandum has so far been used. But 
because exploring a larger variety of cases does not fit within the scope of this article, we leave 
this matter to further research. Here, we only hope to have given at least some initial plausibility 
to the claim that our concept of epistemic integrity fulfils the first requirement of explication. 
4.2. Exactness 
In defining our concept of epistemic integrity, we have not referred to principles such as 
honesty and verifiability without further specifying them. Instead, we have referred to a notion of 
deceptiveness that we have first specified considerably. Therefore, we consider our explicatum 
sufficiently clear and well-defined, and hence, we consider the second requirement of explication 
to be fulfilled. 
4.3. Fruitfulness 
Is our concept of epistemic integrity useful for the development and justification of norms for 
individuals and institutions involved in science? As such norms have already been developed in 
earlier work (e.g., National Academy of Sciences 2002; Resnik 1998; Shamoo & Resnik 2009), 
we will not start from scratch here. Let us start from the standards for science developed in 
Resnik (1998). Resnik proposes the following standards: 
 
Honesty: Scientists should not fabricate, falsify, or misrepresent data or results. They should 
be objective, unbiased, and truthful in all aspects of the research process. 
Carefulness: Scientists should avoid errors in research, especially in presenting results. They 
should minimize experimental, methodological, and human errors and avoid self-deception, 
bias, and conflicts of interest. 
Openness: Scientists should share data, results, methods, ideas, techniques, and tools. They 
should allow other scientists to review their work and be open to criticism and new ideas. 
Freedom: Scientists should be free to conduct research on any problem or hypothesis. They 
should be allowed to pursue new ideas and criticize old ones. 
Credit: Credit should be given where credit is due but not where it is not due. 
Education: Scientists should educate prospective scientists and insure that they learn how to 
conduct good science. Scientists should educate and inform the public about science. 
Social responsibility: Scientists should avoid causing harms to society and they should attempt 
to produce social benefits. Scientists should be responsible for the consequences of their 
research and they should inform the public about those consequences. 
Legality: In the process of research, scientists should obey the laws pertaining to their work. 
Opportunity: Scientists should not be unfairly denied the opportunity to use scientific 
resources or advance in the scientific profession. 
Mutual respect: Scientists should treat colleagues with respect. 
Efficiency: Scientists should use resources efficiently. 
Respect for subjects: Scientists should not violate rights or dignity when using human subjects 
in experiments. Scientists should treat non-human, animal subjects with appropriate respect 
and care when using them in experiments. (Resnik 1998, chapter 4) 
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What we will try to show now is that our concept of epistemic integrity is useful to justify and 
refine some of these standards. 
Resnik uses different grounds in justifying his standards. A first is that violating the standard 
hinders the achievement of the goals of science. Resnik distinguishes two kinds of goals: 
epistemic and practical. The epistemic goals are related to the advancement of human knowledge, 
and the practical goals concern solving problems in engineering, medicine, economics, 
agriculture, and other areas of applied research (Resnik 1998, p. 39). A second kind of 
justification is that adhering to the standard promotes cooperation and trust in science, and a third 
is that it promotes the public‟s trust in science. Fourthly, most standards are also justified on 
moral grounds. We will here only focus on Resnik‟s epistemic justification of standards, that is, 
the justification of a standard on the ground that adhering to it is important for the advancement 
of human knowledge. 
The problem with this kind of justification is that it is not clear what Resnik means by human 
knowledge. It is also not always clear why and how violating the relevant standards exactly 
impedes the advancement of human knowledge. Therefore, the claim that a certain standard is 
justified because violating it hinders the advancement of human knowledge, is not very 
informative. This is where our concept of epistemic integrity comes in. We believe that it enables 
us to give an alternative, more informative epistemic justification of several of Resnik‟s 
standards. 
What we want is that practices in science have the highest degree of epistemic integrity, that 
is, we want the claims produced in science to be non-deceptive. Most of Resnik‟s standards for 
science can be justified on the basis of this desideratum. We distinguish between three kinds of 
standards: those that can be completely justified on the basis of this desideratum, those that can 
only partially be justified on the basis of this desideratum, and those that cannot be justified on 
the basis of this desideratum at all. The standards belonging to the latter category are: social 
responsibility, legality, efficiency, and respect for subjects. Adherence to these standards is 
important for moral reasons, not because violating them damages the epistemic integrity of 
scientific research. 
The standards that can be completely justified on the basis of the ideal of high epistemic 
integrity of scientific practices are: honesty, carefulness, openness, and freedom. Firstly, take the 
principle of honesty: scientists should not fabricate, falsify, or misrepresent data or results, and 
they should be objective, unbiased, and truthful in all aspects of the research process. When 
scientists misrepresent data or results, e.g., when they describe a certain method of research and 
claim that certain data were obtained through this method while in fact they were not (e.g., 
because they were fabricated or falsified), they make a deceptive claim. They present a false 
statement (“this method delivered these data”) as a true statement, and therefore it is deceptive. 
This means that their (so-called) research has low epistemic integrity. Since we want scientific 
research to have the highest degree of epistemic integrity, the conclusion is that scientists should 
not misrepresent data or results. 
Our concept of epistemic integrity can also be used to explain why it is important that 
scientists are objective and unbiased in different aspects of the research process. To illustrate this, 
consider decisions on whether or not to publish certain results. In biomedical science, such 
decisions are sometimes biased; findings that are unfavorable to a certain drug (e.g., the drug is 
ineffective or not safe) are not published, while favorable findings are published more than once 
(Melander 2003; Schott et al. 2010, pp. 296-298). When this is the case, people who consult the 
relevant publications might infer that most research is favorable to the drug while this is in fact 
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false, and this inference is legitimate because all research findings are supposed to be published – 
not just the favorable ones. If a lot of people actually make this inference, the collection of 
publications can be considered highly deceptive, which means that the epistemic integrity of the 
body of research resulting in this collection of publications is low. So in order to guarantee that 
research has the highest degree of epistemic integrity, we should make sure that scientists are 
objective and unbiased in deciding whether or not to publish certain results. 
Now consider the principle of carefulness: scientists should avoid errors in research, especially 
in presenting results, they should minimize experimental, methodological, and human errors, and 
they should avoid self-deception, bias, and conflicts of interest. Different kinds of errors could 
result in deceptive claims. When an instrument produces some false data (experimental error), 
and these data are presented as accurate, a deceptive claim is made. Deceptive claims could also 
be caused by methodological errors. For instance, if biomedical scientists compare adequate 
doses of a drug to inadequate doses of a competing product, interpret the results as saying 
something about the products‟ relative effectiveness for treating a certain condition, assuming 
that both are administered in their most adequate doses (methodological error), and then present 
this false conclusion as true, they make a deceptive claim. Finally, when scientists make a human 
error such as a miscalculation or inaccurate recording of data, and present the outcome as 
accurate, a deceptive claim is made as well. 
How bias could result in deceptive claims should be clear by now. The comparison of 
adequate doses of a product one favors to inadequate doses of a competing product is an example 
of bias, and we also indicated how publication bias could lead to a highly deceptive collection of 
publications. Since such biases typically occur in cases in which those involved in research have 
conflicts of interest, we can conclude that the threat of deception is especially present in cases in 
which those involved in research have a conflict of interest. As errors, bias, and conflicts of 
interest all increase the likelihood that deceptive claims are made, a good strategy to protect the 
epistemic integrity of scientific research is to avoid errors, bias and conflicts of interest, which is 
exactly what Resnik‟s principle of carefulness recommends. 
A third principle that can be completely justified on the basis of our concept of epistemic 
integrity is the principle of openness: scientists should share data, results, methods, ideas, 
techniques, and tools, and they should allow other scientists to review their work and be open to 
criticism and new ideas. Openness is important because it facilitates the detection of deceptive 
claims by outsiders. For example, when the use of inadequate doses of a drug in a clinical trial 
results in a deceptive claim, then this could easily be detected if the actual doses used are shared, 
but not when they are kept secret. The detection of deceptive claims by outsiders is not only 
valuable because this enables us to correct them or replace them by non-deceptive claims, but 
also because it prevents the production of deceptive claims. The easier it is for outsiders to detect 
deceptive claims, the more important it is for scientists to make sure that their claims are non-
deceptive, since their reputation will be damaged if some of their claims are shown to be 
deceptive. So by making it easier for outsiders to detect deceptive claims, openness contributes to 
the non-deceptiveness of claims made in science, and thus, it promotes the epistemic integrity of 
scientific research. 
Fourthly, consider the principle of freedom: scientists should be free to conduct research on 
any problem or hypothesis, and they should be allowed to pursue new ideas and criticize old 
ones. We already saw how making it easier for outsiders to detect deceptive claims promotes the 
epistemic integrity of research. But for outsiders to detect deceptive claims, it is not only 
important that information is shared with them (openness), but also that scientists are allowed to 
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investigate, for any claim made, whether or not it is deceptive. Therefore, scientists‟ freedom to 
criticize claims made by others should be guaranteed. 
There are also some standards that can only partially be justified on the basis of our concept of 
epistemic integrity: credit, education, opportunity, and mutual respect. Adherence to these 
standards is important regardless of whether or not violating them compromises epistemic 
integrity. However, some behaviors that violate them compromise epistemic integrity, and this is 
a reason not to practice such behaviors. Take the principle of credit: credit should be given where 
credit is due but not where it is not due. The main reason why this standard should be respected is 
that all people, including scientists, should be given just rewards for their contributions and 
efforts (Resnik 1998, p. 62). But some aspects of the principle of credit can also be justified on 
the basis of our concept of epistemic integrity. Suppose for instance that a scientist writes a text 
in which he presents certain ideas as his own original work, while in fact he stole these ideas 
from someone else (plagiarism). He then violates the principle of credit because he does not give 
credit where credit is due. Since the reader will infer from the text that the author has developed 
these ideas himself, which is not the case, the text is deceptive, which means that epistemic 
integrity is damaged. So for practices in science to have the highest degree of epistemic integrity, 
scientists should not plagiarize. 
Another example is the use of guest authors and ghostwriters. In biomedical science, persons 
who did not make a significant contribution to a paper – typically academically affiliated 
investigators that are not employed by the company that financed the research – are listed as 
authors (guest authors) (Ross et al. 2008), while company employees who did make a significant 
contribution are not (ghostwriters) (Gøtzsche et al. 2007). This gives the reader a false impression 
of who conducted the research and who contributed what to the paper. Therefore, the statements 
pertaining to authorship are deceptive. So here, too, violating the principle of credit – authorship 
credit is not given where it is due – compromises epistemic integrity. 
A second principle that can be partly justified on the basis of our concept of epistemic 
integrity, is the principle of education: scientists should educate prospective scientists and insure 
that they learn how to conduct good science, and they should educate and inform the public about 
science. If we want scientific research to maintain a high degree of epistemic integrity in the 
future, it is crucial that prospective scientists learn how to make sure that their claims are non-
deceptive. They should, for instance, learn how to avoid different kinds of errors and bias, since 
these could all result in deceptive claims as we have seen. If scientists would not educate 
prospective scientists in this way, the epistemic integrity of future scientific research is 
threatened. Scientists should also educate and inform the public about how to interpret different 
scientific claims in order to avoid that people (legitimately) infer false statements from true 
scientific claims (which would make the scientific claims deceptive). This justification of the 
principle of education is, however, only partial, since prospective scientists should learn more 
than just how to make their claims non-deceptive. 
Thirdly, we can offer a partial epistemic justification of the principle that scientists should not 
be unfairly denied the opportunity to use scientific resources or advance in the scientific 
profession (principle of opportunity). We can expect that the deceptiveness of a claim is more 
likely to be detected if it is investigated by people with different backgrounds, who have different 
perspectives on the claim. Therefore, it is important that people with different backgrounds get 
equal opportunities in science. As this will make it more likely that the deceptiveness of a claim 
is identified, we can expect more deceptive claims to be corrected or replaced by non-deceptive 
claims, and the incentive for scientists to make sure that their claims are non-deceptive will be 
stronger (as they will be more likely to get caught). This epistemic justification of the principle of 
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opportunity is partial because even in a case in which unfairly denying someone the opportunity 
to use scientific resources or advance in the scientific profession (e.g., on the basis of his skin 
color) can be shown not to threaten the epistemic integrity of scientific research in any way, it is 
still unacceptable (on moral grounds). 
A final principle we consider is the principle of mutual respect between scientists, which 
implies that “scientists should not harm one another, either physically or psychologically, that 
they should respect personal privacy, that they should not tamper with each other‟s experiments 
or results, and so forth” (Resnik 1998, p. 67). If there would not be mutual respect in science, 
scientists would probably be less inclined to make sure that other scientists are not deceived by 
the claims they make. As a consequence, we can expect more claims in science to be deceptive, 
and the epistemic integrity of a lot of research would be lower. Therefore, it is important that 
scientists adhere to the principle of mutual respect. Of course, even in cases in which one 
scientist can harm another without threatening epistemic integrity, scientists should not do so (on 
moral grounds). Therefore, our epistemic justification of the principle of mutual respect is only 
partial. 
Finally, we wish to point out that our concept of epistemic integrity is not only useful to justify 
most of Resnik‟s standards for science, but also to refine them. Suppose a scientist fabricates 
certain data (e.g., in order to establish methodological or conceptual problems), that he is clear 
about the fact that the data are fabricated, and that there is no way in which he gives the 
impression that the data are not fabricated. As the principle of honesty states that scientists should 
not fabricate data, it implies that the scientist misbehaves. But since the scientist does not make 
any deceptive claim – he is clear about the fact that the data were fabricated – the epistemic 
integrity of his research is not undermined. Therefore, there is no reason to consider his behavior 
unacceptable. Data fabrication is only unacceptable when the fabricated data are presented as 
empirical data, that is, as the results of empirical research. The reason is that only in the latter 
kind of cases does data fabrication result in deceptive claims, and is the epistemic integrity of the 
(so-called) research undermined. 
As our concept of epistemic integrity is, as we have shown, useful for the justification and 
refinement of standards for science, we consider it a fruitful concept. Hence, the third 
requirement of explication is satisfied. 
4.4. Simplicity 
In order to show that our concept of epistemic integrity is as simple as the three other 
requirements of explication permit, we argue that no parts of our explication can be omitted 
without violating the other requirements. More specifically, we argue, for each part of our 
definition of deceptiveness (on which our explication is based), that if it is omitted, our 
explicatum will be less similar to our common sense notion of research integrity. For most parts, 
we also argue that omitting them will make our explicatum less fruitful. 
The first part we consider is condition (i) of our account of deceptiveness, which is that the 
deceptive statement is presented as a true statement (see section 2). Consider the following case: 
a scientist describes a certain hypothesis, which includes a false statement s, and then rejects it on 
the basis of empirical data. Although s is false, it is not deceptive because the scientist does not 
present it as true; he presents it as part of an hypothesis he rejects. If condition (i) would be 
omitted, s would be deceptive (condition (ii)(a) is met), which means that the epistemic integrity 
of the scientist‟s research would be undermined. This conflicts with our common sense notion of 
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research integrity; we would not say that in the case under consideration, research integrity is 
threatened. 
Furthermore, omitting condition (i) would also make our concept of epistemic integrity less 
useful for the development/justification of standards for science. It would imply that scientists 
should not describe hypotheses that contain false statements (otherwise epistemic integrity is 
undermined). This is, of course, not the kind of standard we want for science. As long as one is 
clear about the fact that what one is describing is only an hypothesis, which may be false, there is 
nothing wrong with describing an hypothesis that contains a false statement. 
Secondly, consider condition (ii)(a) of our account of deceptiveness. Can we omit (ii)(a) 
without weakening our explication? Suppose (1) that scientists make a false claim, for instance, 
that scientific research unambiguously demonstrates that smoking does not increase the risk of 
lung cancer (s4), and (2) that the audience does not bother to infer anything from s4 because it 
thinks the scientists cannot be trusted anyway. As the audience does not infer any false 
statements from s4, condition (ii)(b) is not met. Hence, if we would omit (ii)(a) from our 
definition of deceptiveness, so that a claim would only be deceptive if (i) and (ii)(b) are met, s4 
would not be deceptive, and epistemic integrity would not be undermined. This conflicts with our 
common sense notion of research integrity; it is common sense that research integrity is damaged 
when scientists make false claims such as s4, regardless of whether the audience takes these 
claims seriously. 
Omitting (ii)(a) would also make our concept of epistemic integrity less fruitful. It would not 
enable us to justify the following norm: scientists should not make false claims even when the 
audience will not infer any false statements from these claims (e.g., because it does not take the 
effort to interpret these claims). Our concept of epistemic integrity, which is based on an account 
of deceptiveness that does include (ii)(a), does enable us to justify this norm. Even when the 
audience does not infer any false statements from a false claim, the claim is still deceptive 
according to our account of deceptiveness, as conditions (i) and (ii)(a) are met, and hence, 
epistemic integrity is damaged. Therefore, scientists should not make false claims, regardless of 
what the audience does with these claims. 
Condition (ii)(b) cannot be omitted either. We have added (ii)(b) to permit that true claims can 
nevertheless be deceptive. Take for instance statement s3, discussed in section 2. We have seen 
that when adequate doses of a new test drug are compared to inadequate doses of a competing 
product in a clinical trial, and the study leader claims that the percentage of patients recovering 
from their health condition was significantly higher in the test group (s3) without mentioning that 
the competing product was administered in inadequate doses, then s3 is deceptive even though it 
is true. Accordingly, epistemic integrity is undermined. But if (ii)(b) would be omitted, only false 
claims would be deceptive, and epistemic integrity would not be undermined in the case at hand. 
This conflicts with our common sense notion of research integrity, as we would say that research 
integrity is undermined in the case at hand. 
Another reason why (ii)(b) cannot be omitted is that it would make our concept of epistemic 
integrity less fruitful. Now our concept of epistemic integrity can be used to support the norm 
that scientists should not engage in practices that result in deceptive claims such as s3. If (ii)(b) 
would be omitted, it could not. 
A final question is whether we can omit the second part of condition (ii)(b). Is it sufficient that 
the audience infers a false statement from a claim for this claim to be deceptive, or should this 
inference also be legitimate? We stated that the inference should also be legitimate because we 
want to avoid that the audience can turn non-deceptive claims into deceptive ones by drawing 
absurd conclusions from them. For instance, if the audience infers from the claim that smoking 
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increases the risk of lung cancer (s5) that the earth is flat (s5’), and deceptiveness would not 
require that the inference from s to s’ is legitimate, then this would mean that s5 is deceptive 
(conditions (i) and (ii)(b) would be met), and that epistemic integrity is undermined. This 
conflicts with our common sense notion of research integrity, since research integrity is, 
according to common sense, not undermined when the audience infers s5’ from s5. Because our 
concept of epistemic integrity does require that the inference from s to s’ is legitimate (which is 
not the case for the inference from s5 to s5’), this dissimilarity with the common sense notion of 
research integrity is avoided. 
As no parts of our account of deceptiveness, on which our concept of epistemic integrity is 
based, can be omitted without violating at least one of the other requirements of explication, we 
consider our concept of epistemic integrity as simple as possible. The fourth requirement of 
explication is fulfilled. 
5. Conclusion 
In this article, we tried to explicate the concept of research integrity in a way that is in 
accordance with Carnap‟s characterization of the task of explication. More specifically, we 
introduced a concept we called “epistemic integrity,” and defined the epistemic integrity of a 
practice as a function of the degree to which the statements resulting from this practice are 
deceptive – the more deceptive these statements, the lower the epistemic integrity of the practice. 
Next, we argued that this concept of epistemic integrity is (1) similar to our common sense notion 
of research integrity, (2) exact, (3) fruitful, and (4) as simple as possible. As these are Carnap‟s 
four requirements of explication, we conclude that our concept of epistemic integrity is a good 
explicatum for the concept of research integrity. 
We believe that our concept of epistemic integrity is also very valuable for future research. If 
we want to improve the quality of scientific research, we should look at epistemically 
problematic research practices, investigate their causes, and develop and evaluate different 
strategies to tackle the relevant problems. Our concept of epistemic integrity can help us in 
identifying epistemically problematic research practices, and it enables us to explain why these 
research practices are exactly epistemically problematic. Furthermore, it is also useful to assess 
potential solutions. We can implement different potential solutions and examine how each affects 
the epistemic integrity of scientific research. The more a potential solution promotes the 
epistemic integrity of scientific research, the better it is. 
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